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DEBATE 
 
IS THE FILIBUSTER CONSTITUTIONAL? 
With the help of the President, Democrats in Congress were able 
to pass historic healthcare-reform legislation in spite of—and thanks 
to—the significant structural obstacles presented by the Senate’s ar-
cane parliamentary rules.  After the passage of the bill, the current po-
litical climate appears to require sixty votes for the passage of any ma-
jor legislation, a practice which many argue is unsustainable.  
In Is The Filibuster Constitutional?, Professors Josh Chafetz and Mi-
chael Gerhardt debate the constitutionality of the Senate’s cloture 
rules by looking to the history of those rules in the United States and 
elsewhere.  Professor Chafetz argues that the cloture rules represent 
an unconstitutional principle of entrenchment and highlights the ab-
surdity by analogizing to a hypothetical rule requiring a supermajority 
to unseat an incumbent senator, which would surely not be tolerated.  
Chafetz concludes that historical practice fails to justify obstructionist 
tactics and that any constitutionally conscientious senator has a duty 
to reject the filibuster as it currently operates. 
Professor Gerhardt attributes the Senate’s behavior to the lack of 
a majority committed to curtailing abuses of Senate procedure.  He 
argues that the weaknesses of the traditional arguments against the fi-
libuster underscore the filibuster’s inherent constitutionality.  Ger-
hardt points out that a majority of Senate seats is never subject to elec-
tion at the same time and that the Constitution does not forbid, but 
instead expressly permits, the Senate to draft internal procedures. 
Failing to find an anti-entrenchment principle implied in the constitu-
tional scheme, Gerhardt groups the filibuster with other Senate tradi-
tions—such as holds and bitter partisanship—and finds that the solu-
tion to unsatisfactory behavior in the legislature is, and always has 
been, accountability at the ballot box. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
The Filibuster and the Supermajoritarian Difficulty 
Josh Chafetz†
Suppose that the Senate, using its combined powers to “Judge . . . 
the Elections . . . of its own Members,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 
and to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” id., cl. 2, adopted the 
following rule:  “In any election to this body in which a current sena-
tor seeks reelection, the current senator shall be deemed reelected 
unless sixty percent or more of the duly qualified voters cast their votes 
for another candidate.”  Would this rule be constitutional? 
 
The Seventeenth Amendment provides that “the Senate . . . shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people 
thereof,” and that “[t]he electors in each State shall have the qualifi-
cations requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State legislatures,” but it does not say that the candidate with the most 
votes must win.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  Nor does anything in Article 
I—or anywhere else in the Constitution, for that matter—prescribe ma-
jority rule for congressional elections. 
Yet it seems clear that this hypothetical supermajoritarian rule 
would violate some of our most deeply held constitutional values.  Our 
Constitution, written in the name of “We the People,” cannot coun-
tenance this sort of self-entrenchment by incumbents.  That is to say, 
we understand the concept of an election of representatives to include 
within it a structural principle of majoritarianism.  Our elected repre-
sentatives cannot create a new voting rule that substantially en-
trenches the status quo against change.  For them to do so would be 
for them no longer to be “elected by the people.” 
My contention in this Debate is that the Senate filibuster, as it cur-
rently operates, is strikingly similar to the hypothetical rule described 
above.  Just as we must understand the word “elected” in the Seven-
teenth Amendment to contain a principle of majoritarianism for elec-
tion to Congress, we must also understand the word “passed” in Ar-
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ticle I, Section 7 to contain a principle of majoritarianism for legislat-
ing in Congress. 
I should emphasize at the outset that I am interested not simply in 
the formal rules governing Senate debate but in the way that the fili-
buster in fact operates in the modern Senate.  Moreover, I do not argue 
that any procedural device that delays the implementation of majority 
will at any given moment is unconstitutional.  All procedural require-
ments delay the immediate implementation of majority will.  Structur-
al majoritarianism is a matter of degree, and precise lines between ac-
ceptable delays in implementing majority will and unacceptable 
defiance of majority will are hard to draw.  Nevertheless, a constitu-
tionally conscientious senator is obligated to try. 
The formal rules governing the filibuster are rather simple:  a fili-
buster occurs when a senator or group of senators takes advantage of 
the Senate tradition of unlimited debate in order to delay or obstruct 
a measure.  The only way to end debate and force a vote on most 
measures before the Senate is to invoke cloture.  Senate Rule XXII(2) 
provides that, if sixteen senators sign a cloture petition, then on the 
next business day, the presiding officer will ask whether “it [is] the 
sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?”  
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII(2), as reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 
106-15, at 15-16 (2000).  The cloture motion itself is not debatable; 
therefore, a vote will be taken immediately.  If three-fifths of the sena-
tors “duly sworn and chosen” vote “yes,” then no business is in order 
other than the matter on which cloture has been invoked, and debate 
on that matter is limited to thirty hours, at the end of which a vote 
must be taken.  Id.  There is one exception:  invoking cloture on a 
motion to amend the Senate rules requires two-thirds of the senators 
present and voting rather than three-fifths of the senators sworn and 
chosen.  Id.  Moreover, because the Senate, unlike the House, is con-
sidered a “continuing body,” see, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 
421 U.S. 491, 512 (1975) (“the House, unlike the Senate, is not a con-
tinuing body”), its rules never expire.  But see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427456 
(presenting a number of arguments against the “continuing body” 
theory).  Senate Rule XXII exists in perpetuity, unless it is amended—
and amending it would almost certainly involve invoking cloture, which 
would require a two-thirds vote. 
This formalist account of Senate procedure, however, must be 
supplemented with an understanding of how the filibuster has actually 
operated in recent years.  Simply put, cloture has now effectively be-
248 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 245 
PENNumbra 
come a requirement for passage of any significant measure.  Even a 
casual glance at the history of cloture motions makes this apparent.  
When the cloture motion was first introduced into Senate rules in 
1917, it required a two-thirds vote to pass.  See Catherine Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 198 (1997).  From 
the 66th Congress (1919–1920) to the 91st Congress (1969–1970), 
there were never more than seven cloture motions filed in a single 
Congress, and cloture was never invoked more than three times.  U.S. 
Senate, Senate Action on Cloture Motions, http://www.senate.gov/ 
pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last vi-
sited Apr. 1, 2010).  It can hardly be said that no contentious legisla-
tion came up during this fifty-year period—indeed, it is worth noting 
that even though Democrats never had a filibuster-proof majority dur-
ing the 73rd Congress (1933–1934), that Congress managed to pass 
much of the major legislation of the First New Deal without a single clo-
ture petition having been filed.  See id. 
A rise in filibusters in the early 1970s led to the amendment that 
gave Rule XXII its present form.  From the 94th Congress (1975–
1976) to the 102nd Congress (1991–1992), the number of cloture pe-
titions filed ranged from twenty-three to fifty-nine, and cloture was 
never invoked more than twenty-two times in a Congress.  Id.  The 
number increased between the 103rd Congress (1993–1994) and the 
109th Congress (2005–2006), with between sixty-two and eighty-two 
motions filed and cloture invoked between nine and thirty-four times.  
Id.  And then came the 110th Congress (2007–2008):  a whopping 139 
cloture motions were filed, with cloture invoked sixty-one times.  The 
111th Congress is on course for even higher numbers—as of this writ-
ing, there have been eighty-two cloture motions filed, and cloture has 
been invoked forty-four times.  Id. 
A number of factors have contributed to the increased use of fili-
busters, including changes to procedural mechanisms (the creation of 
separate legislative “tracks” has allowed other Senate business to con-
tinue while one matter is being filibustered, thus lowering the cost of 
a filibuster), see Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, A One-Track Se-
nate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A27; institutional culture (a decline 
in senatorial bonhomie has increased the willingness of senators to 
engage in obstructionism), see THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. 
ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH:  HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA 
AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 146-48 (2006); and the national 
political map (partisan realignment has made it more difficult to at-
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tract bipartisan support for anything), see generally EARL BLACK & 
MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS (2002). 
Regardless of the precise constellation of causes of this increase in 
filibusters, two things are clear:  the filibuster is no longer reserved on-
ly for issues of unusual importance, nor is it used simply to extend de-
bate on an issue.  A senator who intends to vote against final passage 
of a bill need no longer separately justify her decision to vote against 
cloture.  As a functional matter, it can now be said that it requires sixty 
votes to pass a piece of legislation in the Senate—or, as Roy Edroso 
eloquently put it on a Village Voice blog the day after Republican Scott 
Brown won a special election to fill Ted Kennedy’s Massachusetts Se-
nate seat, “Scott Brown Wins Mass. Race, Giving GOP 41-59 Majority 
in the Senate.”  Posting of Roy Edroso to Runnin’ Scared, Scott Brown 
Wins Mass. Race, Giving GOP 41-59 Majority in the Senate, 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/2010/01/ 
scott_brown_win.php ( Jan. 20, 2010); see also David R. Mayhew, Su-
permajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003) 
(noting the widespread perception that sixty votes is the threshold for 
Senate passage). 
The question, then, is this:  is a constitutionally conscientious sen-
ator obligated to reject a system in which a supermajority is required 
to pass a bill and an even larger supermajority is required to alter that 
supermajority requirement?  I think the answer is “yes.”  As Jed Ru-
benfeld has persuasively argued, “[w]hat it means for a bill to ‘pass’ 
the House or Senate is not open for definition by the House or Se-
nate.  It is constitutionally fixed by the implicit majority-rule meaning 
of ‘passed.’”  Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage:  Majority Rule in Congress, 
46 DUKE L.J. 73, 83 (1996).  Of course, the Constitution itself imposes 
supermajority requirements in some cases.  See Michael J. Gerhardt, 
The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 455 n.38 
(2004) (listing the seven situations in which the Constitution requires 
a supermajority vote).  But where the Constitution does not specify 
otherwise, the word “passed”—like the word “elected”—should be un-
derstood to prescribe majority rule.  It would be odd to operate with a 
majoritarian assumption when voting for representatives but not when 
those representatives themselves vote.  After all, if Congress can re-
quire sixty votes to alter the status quo, then why not ninety-nine?  
Why can it not declare its own legislation unrepealable?  Surely that 
sort of entrenchment of legislation is every bit as antithetical to popu-
lar sovereignty as the entrenchment of legislators in the hypothetical at 
the beginning of this Opening Statement. 
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Supporters of the filibuster may, at this point, turn to history.  
They will say that the United States has a long history of unlimited de-
bate and that this history supports the constitutionality of the filibus-
ter.  See Gerhardt, supra, at 451-55.  But of course today’s filibuster is 
not about unlimited debate—indeed, it is not about debate at all.  It is 
simply about permanent minority obstruction.  And that has a some-
what lesser history.  The use of unlimited debate solely for the pur-
poses of obstruction was almost unknown in the British House of 
Commons until Charles Stewart Parnell was elected in 1875.  Parnell, 
“who employed parliamentary obstruction to block all government 
business so that Irish reform would be effected,” can be understood as 
“the real founder of wilful or conscious obstruction” in the House of 
Commons.  Geddes W. Rutherford, Some Aspects of Parliamentary Ob-
struction, 22 SEWANEE REV. 166, 174 (1914); see also 1 JOSEF REDLICH, 
THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 138-40 (A. Ernest Stein-
thal trans., 1908).  The reaction to this new method of obstruction was 
swift:  in 1882, the House of Commons adopted by majority vote (in-
deed, by a slim majority of 304 to 260) a resolution introduced by Wil-
liam Gladstone giving the Speaker the authority to inform the House 
“that [a] subject has been adequately discussed.”  137 H.C. Jour. 505 
(Nov. 10, 1882).  Thereafter, a majority could vote to end debate and 
force a vote on the issue in question.  Id.  In Britain, once the power 
of unlimited debate came to be used for long-term obstruction, it was 
quickly taken away. 
In the United States, too, the history is not unambiguously pro-
filibuster.  Jefferson, the great parliamentarian of the early Republic 
and President of the Senate from 1797 to 1801, wrote, “No one is to 
speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluously, or tedious-
ly.”  THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR 
THE USE OF THE SENATE IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (Gov’t Printing Of-
fice 1993) (1801).  Indeed, the rules adopted by the First Senate pro-
vided that the presiding officer could call a member to order, at which 
point the member “shall sit down.”  1 SEN. J. 12, 13 (1789).  True, dila-
tory tactics were first used in 1790, but only to delay a vote long 
enough that an ill senator—who happened to be the decisive vote—
could participate.  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at 187-88 (describ-
ing the incident).  This was a use of the filibuster in the service of ma-
joritarianism, not in derogation of it.  Over the next sixteen years, the 
“previous question” motion provided for in the First Senate’s rules, see 
1 SEN. J. 12, 13 (1789), was used on four occasions to end debate.  Ri-
chard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate in the Senate:  The First Phase, 83 POL. 
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SCI. Q. 419, 421 (1968).  When the “previous question” motion was 
abolished in 1806, it was because of “the belief that the rule’s infre-
quent use made it unnecessary,” not because of any desire to allow un-
limited minority obstruction.  Id. 
The great nineteenth-century champion of the use of unlimited 
debate for obstructionist purposes was none other than John C. Cal-
houn.  See id. at 421-31; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at 189-92.  And as 
Fisk and Chemerinsky note, the nineteenth century’s smaller volume 
of legislation allowed the majority to wait out filibusters so that “al-
most every filibustered measure before 1880 was eventually passed.”  
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at 195.  When that ceased to be the case, 
the Senate adopted the first cloture rule in 1917.  Id. at 198.  For most 
of the twentieth century, of course, the filibuster was largely used to 
obstruct civil rights legislation.  Id. at 199.  John C. Calhoun and 
Strom Thurmond are indeed precedents for the power of a minority 
to indefinitely obstruct legislation in the Senate—but are they prece-
dents that filibuster proponents are proud to claim, or does their pre-
cedential value partake more of Plessy than of Brown? 
Constitutional structure cannot support the filibuster as it exists 
today any more than it can support the hypothetical rule with which 
this Opening Statement began.  And history establishes no unambi-
guous right to obstruct.  Of course, these observations raise at least as 
many questions as they answer.  All procedural rules delay the imple-
mentation of majority will—how much delay is too much?  All rule-
making has at least something of an entrenching effect—how much 
entrenchment is too much?  These questions do not admit of easy an-
swers, and they are certainly not suitable for judicial resolution.  See 
JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:  LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 
AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONS 57-59 (2007) (arguing that each chamber’s internal rules are 
generally nonjusticiable).  But the fact that courts underenforce these 
constitutional norms makes it all the more important for constitution-
ally conscientious members of Congress to take them very seriously.  
See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586 (1975) (arguing that judicial re-
straint in addressing certain constitutional issues does not “suggest[] 
that the legislature should exercise restraint in assessing the constitu-
tionality of its own product”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:  The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 
1240 (1978) (“[T]he legislature is permitted to refine . . . [certain 
constitutional] notions beyond the capacity of the judiciary to do 
so.”).  senators will have to draw their own lines and devise their own 
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remedies.  But whatever line they draw, the filibuster as practiced to-
day must be on the wrong side. 
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REBUTTAL 
The Filibuster and the Conscientious Senate 
Michael J. Gerhardt†
My friend Professor Chafetz never disappoints, and his Opening 
Statement is as thoughtful and novel a critique of the filibuster as any 
I have read.  His principal argument is that the filibuster has been in-
creasingly used in violation of Article I, Section 7’s “principle of majo-
ritarianism for legislating in Congress.”  While I do not agree with this 
argument, I do believe that the lawmaking process within the Senate 
has become frustrating—albeit not because of the filibuster or some-
thing unconstitutional.  The problem is that the Senate lacks a majori-
ty genuinely committed to challenging abuses of Senate procedures 
and to ruling on many issues. 
 
Professor Chafetz acknowledges but does not dawdle over either 
of the conventional arguments against the constitutionality of the fili-
buster.  Nevertheless, they are worth examining briefly because un-
derstanding why they are wrong underscores the constitutionality of 
the filibuster.  The first objection is that the filibuster as a delaying 
mechanism is unconstitutional because it is not specifically authorized 
by the Constitution.  (I am not sure whether Professor Chafetz agrees 
with this objection because he does not argue that any procedural de-
vice that delays the implementation of majority will at any given mo-
ment is unconstitutional.)  The first problem with this objection is 
that Article I, Section 5 expressly vests the House and the Senate each 
with the authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”  U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  The Framers were not averse to establishing 
specific procedural requirements in the House or Senate (such as quo-
rum requirements for doing business or requirements that senators be 
on oath or affirmation in impeachment trials), but in Section 5 they 
specified no limitations on the procedures that the House or Senate 
may devise for its proceedings.  See id.  This Section plainly grants to 
the Senate plenary authority to devise procedures for internal gover-
nance, and the filibuster is a rule for debate.  Second, historical prac-
tices overwhelmingly support the filibuster’s constitutionality.  See gen-
erally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 
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CONST. COMM. 445, 451-55 (2004).  Professor Chafetz acknowledges 
that the filibuster, in one form or another, has been a feature of the Se-
nate since 1790.  It is one of many countermajoritarian procedures, in-
cluding unanimous-consent requirements governing what comes to the 
floor for consideration in the Senate. 
The second conventional objection to the filibuster is that Senate 
Rule XXII, which allows a filibuster of a motion to amend the Rule 
and requires a supermajority to end any such filibuster, STANDING 
RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, as reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 106-15, at 
15-17 (2000), is unconstitutional.  The argument (about which I take 
Professor Chafetz to be agnostic) is that Rule XXII violates an anti-
entrenchment principle implied in Article I that bars a present major-
ity from binding the hands of a future one to act as it pleases with re-
spect to any legislative matter. 
There is, however, no such principle.  To begin with, Article I says 
nothing about, much less anything against, entrenchment, and Senate 
Rule XXII’s procedures for amending Rule XXII are consistent with 
the plenary authority expressly given to the Senate to determine the 
rules for its proceedings.  Second, historical practices amply uphold 
Rule XXII’s entrenchment.  The Senate has consistently stood behind 
this Rule and consistently required that efforts to amend it be done in 
accordance with the Senate’s rules, including the supermajority voting 
requirements set forth therein.  Third, Rule XXII is one of many 
standing rules in the Senate that have become entrenched because of 
the Senate’s structure.  Article I, Section 3 has structured the Senate 
“so that one third may be chosen every second Year.”  U.S. CONST., 
art. I, § 3, cl. 2.  The Senate has been designed, in other words, so that 
every election cycle, only a third of its seats are up for election.  This 
design makes the Senate unique among legislatures as a “continuing 
body” because two-thirds of its members carry their terms over from 
one legislative session to the next.  Indeed, in dicta, the Supreme 
Court has said as much on three separate occasions. 
The anti-entrenchment principle presumes that entrenchment is 
illegal because it prevents a newly elected majority from adopting 
whatever rules it prefers, but in the Senate there never is a majority of 
seats subject to election at any one time.  There is thus no group in 
the Senate in a position analogous to the full membership of the 
House, in which every two years there is, by design, a genuinely new 
majority that is elected.  Professor Chafetz’s concern is with majority 
rule, but if a majority changes in the Senate it is because of the out-
comes of elections involving only one-third of the seats.  I know of no 
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constitutional principle investing a third of a legislative body with spe-
cial power to remake the body itself. 
This brings us to Professor Chafetz’s principal concern that “clo-
ture has now effectively become a requirement for passage of any sig-
nificant measure.”  Professor Chafetz is right that the filibuster has 
been increasingly used to obstruct legislative action, but it is a mistake 
to infer any constitutional violation from this obstruction.  First, fili-
busters are not just directed at bills.  Many are directed at judicial and 
other nominations.  Professor Chafetz is relying on the language of 
Article I, Section 7 for the basis of the “principle of majoritarianism,” 
but this language only pertains to bills or resolutions requiring presi-
dential signatures—not to presidential nominations.  One must look 
elsewhere for textual support to constitutionalize majority rule on 
nominations, but there is none. 
Second, Article I, Section 7 speaks only to what may happen once 
a bill reaches the floor of the House or Senate.  It says nothing about 
the process through which a bill—or any other matter that may be fi-
libustered—may reach the Senate floor.  Article I, Section 5 obviously 
governs that process, while Article I, Section 7 governs something dif-
ferent—the procedures after passage of a bill in the House or Senate. 
Third, the filibuster is one of many Senate procedures that may 
preclude final floor action.  When committees reject nominations or 
committee chairs refuse to schedule hearings or votes on nominations 
or other legislative matters, their decisions are effectively final.  Yet 
none of these procedures violates Article I, Section 7.  The fact that a 
bill or nomination is stymied through the tactical use of procedures 
does not mean that Article I, Section 7 is violated:  it means the Senate 
has followed its own rules. 
Nor does Article I establish a time limit by which a matter must be 
resolved in the Senate.  It is impossible to square a “principle of majo-
ritarianism” with the fact that sometimes bills or nominations make it 
through committee with little or no time left for the Senate to act.  I 
doubt Professor Chafetz is arguing that this principle of majoritarian-
ism requires that a bill or nomination must come to the Senate floor 
even if no time is left for the Senate to act.  American history is replete 
with bills dying in this manner. 
Fourth, majoritarianism is not a fixed constitutional principle.  In 
upholding a state constitutional and statutory requirement that cer-
tain changes not be made in the state constitution unless approved by 
at least sixty percent of the voters in a referendum election, the Su-
preme Court declared, “Certainly any departure from strict majority 
rule gives disproportionate power to the minority.  But, there is noth-
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ing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that 
requires that a majority always prevail on every issue.”  Gordon v. Lance, 
403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).  This ruling underscores the fact that while there 
may be constitutional limits to the Senate’s internal rulemaking au-
thority, mandatory majority rule is not one of them. 
The deliberative process within the Senate is not, however, with-
out problems.  Among them is the two-track system for filibusters.  I 
agree that silent filibusters—those that have the effect of deflecting 
business simply as a result of being threatened—are problematic.  
They are problematic because they obscure one of the most important 
checks on abuses of the filibuster:  the political accountability of the 
members of the Senate.  One cannot, or at least I will not, argue that 
there was anything noble in filibustering civil rights legislation in the 
1950s and 1960s; however, at least those filibusters had to be above 
radar and the people making them were politically accountable.  The 
two-track system provides the wrong incentives to senators:  it allows 
them to obstruct Senate business but without paying much, if any, po-
litical cost for doing so. 
Beyond silent filibusters, there are two other problems impeding 
majoritarianism in the Senate.  One is the problem of holds.  A 
longstanding practice of the Senate is the entitlement of each senator 
to ask the majority leader to place a temporary, anonymous hold on 
virtually any piece of legislative business headed to the floor.  Such 
holds (sometimes done tag team by members of the opposition party) 
have been used to obstruct more than a few of President Obama’s 
nominations.  This obstruction is often done merely to make the Pres-
ident or Senate Democrats look bad.  It is, however, telling that once 
the Democrats challenged the holds and threatened filibusters against 
some judicial nominations, the latter were approved unanimously or 
nearly unanimously.  (Two recent examples are the unanimous con-
firmations of Barbara Keenan to the Fourth Circuit and Rogeriee 
Thompson to the First Circuit.)  An obvious difficulty with taming ab-
usive holds is that the holds are done anonymously, so it is practically 
impossible to hold senators politically accountable for abusing their 
hold privileges.  It is up to senators to keep each other honest in their 
deployment of holds. 
Another, more important reason for obstruction in the Senate is 
the absence of a majority committed to ruling on everything.  As re-
flected in the unanimous confirmations of Judges Keenan and 
Thompson, the votes of eleven Republican senators for President Ob-
ama’s jobs bill, and the support of nine Republican senators for Jus-
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tice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation, party fidelity does not invariably 
preclude the Senate from acting.  But, in order for there to be ob-
struction, there has to be something to obstruct, and on many issues 
there is no working majority.  In their 2006 study of the filibuster, 
Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler suggested that “the great irony [is] 
that filibusters have become costless for the minority because the costs 
to the majority of engaging in wars of attrition have become prohibi-
tively high.”  GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER:  OB-
STRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 263 (2006).  They 
concluded that 
[t]he majority could fully clamp down on the minority as was done in 
the House over a century ago, but to do so would likely require a majori-
ty of senators to agree to give up the wellspring of their power by curtail-
ing the right of recognition and other prerogatives.  At this moment, an 
insufficient number of senators seem willing to start down the path that 
would lead to quotidian majority rule. 
Id. at 281.  The numbers within the Senate might sometimes fool us 
into thinking there is a majority disposed to rule.  The fact that for the 
past year Democrats had sixty seats in the Senate and that Republicans 
had fifty-five seats from 2004–2006 did not ensure that in either pe-
riod there was a majority committed or prepared to consistently ruling 
the Senate.  Where there is a Senate majority determined to act, it is 
nearly impossible to stop, as recently demonstrated in the fact that the 
opposition of every Republican in the Senate did not prevent the pas-
sage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148 (2010).  But sometimes neither party controls a majority of 
Senate seats, and sometimes there are no working majorities on certain 
issues.  The Constitution cannot establish a majority where there is none. 
The solution to this scenario is not judicial review or deviation 
from the rules in order to amend them but rather the electoral 
process.  Using elections to hold public officials accountable and not 
changing the rules in the middle of the game are both among our 
longstanding traditions.  While the upcoming mid-term elections 
might not change the Senate’s leadership, it is through such elections 
that the will to govern may be fortified or eroded. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Fixing the Filibuster 
Josh Chafetz 
Michael Gerhardt is one of the smartest and most knowledgeable 
constitutional scholars around; anyone who disagrees with Professor 
Gerhardt about an issue of constitutional law would do well to reex-
amine her own views.  It is with a sigh of relief, then, that I realize that 
Professor Gerhardt and I agree about the filibuster significantly more 
than we disagree.  First, we agree that the increased use of the filibus-
ter has more or less made cloture a de facto requirement for the pas-
sage of most bills through the Senate.  Second, we agree that, in Pro-
fessor Gerhardt’s words, lawmaking in the Senate “has become 
frustrating.”  Third, we agree that neither judicial review nor the flout-
ing of Senate rules is the appropriate response (although I would add 
the caveat that, just as “a legislative act contrary to the constitution is 
not law,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), so 
too a resolution contrary to the Constitution cannot create a binding 
Senate rule).  And fourth, we agree that the two-track system, the in-
crease in the use of “holds,” and the sometime timidity of the Senate 
majority are significant problems (though happily, the recent passage 
of healthcare-reform legislation suggests that the majority may have 
taken this latter message to heart). 
We do, however, differ on at least one key point:  I think that the 
filibuster as currently practiced is unconstitutional, and Professor 
Gerhardt does not.  This point of disagreement is an important one, 
because if I am right, a senator who takes her oath seriously, see U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, § 3, is obligated to take steps to alter or abolish the fili-
buster so as to make Senate rules constitutional.  If Professor Gerhardt is 
right, then senators need only make policy calculations about the filibus-
ter.  With some trepidation, then, I am compelled to press my point. 
Professor Gerhardt begins with a textual argument:  the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause, id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, contains “no limitations on the 
procedures that the House or Senate may devise for its proceedings.”  
This, of course, is true, but it cannot be the end of the matter.  Surely, 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause is subject to limitations laid out else-
where in the Constitution.  I take it, for example, that a Senate rule 
banning practitioners of certain religions from serving on committees 
would be an unconstitutional violation of the Religious Test Clause, 
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id. art. VI, § 3, even thought it falls within the ambit of the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause.  Likewise, the hypothetical with which I began my 
Opening Statement posited an internal Senate rule to govern the Se-
nate’s resolution of disputed elections.  Specifically, the hypothetical 
rule provided that an incumbent would be deemed reelected unless a 
challenger received sixty percent or more of the vote.  Professor Ger-
hardt does not respond to my hypothetical, but for those who share 
my conclusion that the hypothetical rule is unconstitutional, it estab-
lishes two important points.  First, it makes it clear that there are con-
stitutional limitations on each chamber’s powers under the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause—not every rule a chamber might devise is consti-
tutional.  And second, it suggests that the Senate’s rulemaking power 
might be limited by an implicit principle of majoritarianism—that the 
phrase “elected by the people” in the Seventeenth Amendment forbids 
the Senate from creating rules that require a supermajority for election 
to Congress.  So, while it is true that the Rules of Proceedings Clause does 
not, by itself, limit the kinds of rules the Senate can make, other constitu-
tional principles do.  And in at least one case—my hypothetical—that li-
miting constitutional principle is an implicit guarantee of majority rule. 
Of course, the mere fact that “elected by the people” in the Seven-
teenth Amendment seems to carry a requirement of majoritarianism 
does not necessarily mean that “passed” in Article I, Section 7 carries 
the same requirement.  Here, Professor Gerhardt relies on both the 
long history of Senate filibusters and the fact that the filibuster is 
hardly alone among Senate procedures in frustrating majority will.  
But I remain unconvinced.  As to the historical practice, I spent a 
good portion of my Opening Statement on the issue, and I will not 
rehash that discussion here.  My conclusion there was that the filibus-
ter as practiced today is qualitatively different from, and therefore 
cannot be justified by, the historical practice.  Early filibusters may 
have been able to delay legislation, but they did not permanently ob-
struct it.  When filibusters did begin to permanently obstruct legisla-
tion, the cloture rule was introduced (in 1917) and then made easier 
to invoke (in 1975).  Only in the last few years has cloture become ne-
cessary on almost every piece of significant legislation. 
Today, the filibuster operates as a standing requirement that im-
portant legislation (outside of the budget process) needs sixty votes to 
pass.  This cannot be justified by the fact that a few senators in 1790 
kept the floor and stalled so that the absence of an ill colleague on a 
rainy day would not result in a bill’s passage.  See Catherine Fisk & Er-
win Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1997) 
(describing the 1790 incident).  Although that incident may some-
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times be called a “filibuster,” it has very little in common with today’s 
filibuster.  We should not be fooled by linguistic drift.  Cf. In re Erick-
son, 815 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[I]f a change in lan-
guage or function should cause a new name to be applied to [an old 
idea or practice] . . . it would be necessary to examine the function of 
the denotation . . . .”). 
Professor Gerhardt also suggests that the filibuster is just one of 
many antimajoritarian rules of legislative procedure—it cannot be un-
constitutional unless they all are, the argument goes.  Professor Ger-
hardt gives the examples of committee power, holds, and unanimous 
consent agreements as limits on majoritarianism.  But, on closer ex-
amination, none of these results in the permanent minority obstruc-
tion of legislation the way today’s filibuster does.  First, consider 
committees:  Obviously, if a committee approves a measure, it still 
must go to the full chamber; there is nothing antimajoritarian about 
this.  But, Professor Gerhardt says, when a committee disapproves a 
measure, it can effectively kill it.  This overlooks the fact, however, that 
both chambers have mechanisms by which a determined majority can 
circumvent a hostile committee.  In the House, that mechanism is a 
discharge petition, which requires the signatures of a majority of Rep-
resentatives.  See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 
86-87 (4th ed. 2008).  In the Senate, there are two options.  A bill can 
be introduced directly on the Senate floor, as was done with the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, where the floor leaders sought to avoid getting 
bogged down in the Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator James 
Eastland, a Democrat from Mississippi.  See CHARLES WHALEN & BAR-
BARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 132-35 (1985).  Alternatively, because the Se-
nate does not require amendments to be germane, any member can 
offer a bill that is trapped in committee as an amendment to a bill that 
is already on the floor.  See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra, at 108.  
Either way, the committee has been circumvented. 
Holds are antimajoritarian, but only because they are parasitic on 
the filibuster.  As Professor Gerhardt notes, the hold is an informal 
device whereby senators anonymously ask the majority leader not to 
bring business to the floor for a certain period of time.  Sometimes 
this is done for good reason (e.g., to accommodate senators’ sche-
dules or to allow more time for consideration of a measure); other 
times, members will serially file holds in an attempt to forestall any 
consideration of the measure.  But the majority leader only respects 
holds of the second kind because of the possibility of a filibuster.  In 
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essence, a hold functions as the threat of a filibuster, should the mat-
ter be brought to the floor.  Filibuster reform, then, would also be 
hold reform. 
Finally, Professor Gerhardt points to the large amount of business 
done in the Senate by unanimous consent as evidence of widespread 
antimajoritarianism.  But unanimous consent is, in the end, an expe-
diting procedure.  Absent unanimous consent, there remains a regu-
lar order of business, and matters can still be considered in this way.  
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra, at 109-18.  Unanimous consent 
agreements governing Senate debate are so popular precisely because 
they represent a precommitment by all senators not to filibuster. 
In short, the filibuster as practiced today requires a supermajority 
vote for the passage of most legislation.  (Professor Gerhardt correctly 
notes that I am primarily interested in legislation.  For most nomi-
nations, recess appointments can be used to circumvent filibusters.  
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Bypasses 
Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1.  For 
judicial nominations, I think the Senate’s refusal to vote may well vi-
olate its constitutional obligation to give “Advice and Consent.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.)  Although other devices may slow or burden 
majority rule, no other device in Congress allows for permanent mi-
nority obstruction in this way.  This makes today’s filibuster qualita-
tively different from the “filibusters” of early American history, and it 
also makes it qualitatively different from other procedural rules in 
Congress.  In the end, and despite Professor Gerhardt’s thought-
provoking and careful arguments to the contrary, I remain convinced 
that the closest analogue to today’s filibuster is the hypothetical—and 
unconstitutional—rule with which I began my Opening Statement. 
What, then, is to be done?  First, I wholeheartedly agree with Pro-
fessor Gerhardt’s suggestion, also made recently by Barry Friedman 
and Andrew Martin, that abolition of the two-track system for filibus-
ters would be a step in the right direction.  Barry Friedman & Andrew 
D. Martin, A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A27.  It 
would preserve the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate, while ab-
olishing obstruction unrelated to debate.  A constitutionally conscien-
tious senator has a number of other options, as well.  At one extreme 
would be some version of the “nuclear option”—either a ruling by the 
presiding officer (sustained by majority vote) that the supermajority 
requirement for cloture is unconstitutional, or a ruling by the presid-
ing officer that the Senate is not a continuing body, thus allowing the 
adoption of new rules (again, by majority vote) at the beginning of the 
next Congress.  One less extreme response would be to institute a 
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“declining filibuster,” whereby the number of votes needed to invoke 
cloture on a measure would gradually decline until a bare majority 
sufficed.  See S. Res. 416, 111th Cong. (2010) (pending resolution to 
amend Senate rules to create a declining filibuster); Sen. Tom Har-
kin, Fixing the Filibuster, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 12, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-tom-harkin/fixing-the- 
filibuster_b_459969.html (explaining the proposal).  A related solu-
tion would be to treat the failure to invoke cloture as a suspensive, ra-
ther than an absolute, veto.  This would allow forty-one senators to delay 
a final vote for a certain amount of time but not to prevent one indefi-
nitely.  See Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564747. 
What these proposals have in common is that they allow a deter-
mined majority to get its way—not immediately, but in the end.  They 
therefore satisfy the structural majoritarianism principle of Article I.  I 
think a constitutionally conscientious senator could support any of 
these proposals (or, indeed, some combination of them).  But despite 
Professor Gerhardt’s spirited defense of the filibuster’s constitutionali-
ty, I end my Closing Statement on the same note on which I ended my 
Opening Statement:  a constitutionally conscientious senator cannot 
support the practice of the filibuster as it currently exists. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Still Standing After All These Years 
Michael J. Gerhardt 
Upon seeing Niagara Falls for the first time, Oscar Wilde reputed-
ly remarked that “[i]t would be more impressive if it flowed the other 
way.”  In his thoughtful, well-argued Opening and Closing Statements, 
Professor Chafetz has tried mightily to reverse the flow of constitu-
tional support for the filibuster, but I believe his efforts are in vain.  
The filibuster still stands because its constitutional support is so 
strong.  Professor Chafetz’s novel arguments might obscure the 
strength of this support as well as the fact that, even though they are 
longstanding, the arguments against the constitutionality of the fili-
buster have never prevailed in any forum, with the possible exception 
of the academy.  As the history of the filibuster shows, the filibuster’s 
constitutional pedigree is sufficiently strong that if amended, it will be 
done—as it always has been done—in accordance with the Senate 
rules and, even then, as a reaction to enormous pressure from within 
the Senate and the American people. 
Professor Chafetz’s first, strong push against the constitutionality 
of the filibuster is through his hypothetical Senate rule requiring that 
senators must be elected by at least  sixty percent of the popular vote.  
He suggests that this hypothetical rule is unconstitutional for the same 
reason the filibuster is—namely, because each violates a constitutional 
principle of majoritarianism. 
The analogy does not work, however, for several reasons.  First, it 
obscures the fact that Article I, Section 5, contains no internal con-
straint on the Senate’s power to “determine Rules of its Proceedings.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.  If the filibuster is unconstitutional, it is be-
cause it violates some external constraint—some fundamental right or 
principle—derived from another part of the Constitution.  Professor 
Chafetz’s hypothetical is unconstitutional precisely because it violates 
two external constraints:  the Qualifications Clause in Article I (which 
the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-48 
(1969), construed as setting forth the only three permissible limita-
tions on qualifications for being seated in Congress) and federalism 
principles (particularly state sovereignty to organize local elections in 
accordance with other constitutional provisions, including the Seven-
teenth Amendment).  Obviously, Rule XXII, STANDING RULES OF THE 
SENATE, R. XXII, as reprinted in S. Doc. 106-15, at 15-17 (2000), does 
not violate the Qualifications Clause or state sovereignty.. 
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The one external constraint that Professor Chafetz cites as the 
principal limitation on the filibuster—Article I, Section 7—is inap-
plicable to both his hypothetical and the filibuster.  Section 7 defines 
the procedures to be followed in order for a bill to become law after it 
has “passed” the Congress.  Professor Chafetz’s hypothetical is not, 
however, the kind of legislative action to which Section 7 applies.  The 
plainest, most sensible reading of Sections 5 and 7 together is that the 
former pertains to the Senate’s power to devise the rules for its inter-
nal governance and the latter dictates the procedure after a bill has 
“passed” on the floor.  By its plain language, Section 7 does not apply 
to internal governance.  It makes little or no sense to construe it as 
overriding the plenary authority over internal governance that is given 
just two sections before in Section 5, especially because the two Sec-
tions plainly deal with different phases of the lawmaking process. 
Professor Chafetz’s novel reading of Section 7 amounts to a con-
stitutional entitlement of a bill to reach the floor of the House or Se-
nate.  This is an inevitable consequence of his principle of majorita-
rianism, because it would be impossible, in the absence of such an 
entitlement, to know for sure whether the principle was actually satis-
fied.  There is, however, nothing in the language of the Constitu-
tion—or any other source of which I know—that would provide such a 
special entitlement for legislation.  Professor Chafetz would agree, I 
am sure, that the lawmaking process in Article I was designed to be 
cumbersome—to make it harder, not easier, to enact laws. 
Professor Chafetz’s strong, second push against the constitutional-
ity of the filibuster is to question its historical support.  Professor Cha-
fetz suggests that the Framers did not envision a filibuster in its 
present form, though, as he acknowledges, the practice of endless de-
bate traces its roots to ancient Rome.  More relevantly, the Senate has 
employed this practice from the beginning.  As Professors Catherine 
Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky note in their extended study of the fili-
buster, “[t]he strategic use of delay in debate is as old as the Senate 
itself.  The first recorded episode of dilatory debate occurred in 1790, 
when senators from Virginia and South Carolina filibustered to pre-
vent the location of the first Congress in Philadelphia.”  Catherine 
Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 489 STAN. L. REV. 181, 187 
(1997).  Similarly, Robert Caro, in his study of Lyndon Johnson’s Se-
nate years, depicts the uninterrupted use of the filibuster (and func-
tionally identical devices) from 1790 to the 1950s, see ROBERT A. CARO, 
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON:  MASTER OF THE SENATE 91-93 (2002), 
while Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport conclude, af-
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ter studying the filibuster’s history, that “the continuous use of filibus-
ters since the early Republic provides compelling support for their 
constitutionality.”  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements:  A Defense, 105 
YALE L.J. 483, 497 (1995).  Professor Chafetz suggests that the filibus-
ter to which these studies refer is not the same as the one to which he 
objects, though this seems to be a distinction without a difference 
since Rule XXII is directly traceable to and based on these earlier, 
longstanding practices. 
The House, too, has employed several supermajority voting re-
quirements, sometimes to obstruct lawmaking.  Indeed, the filibuster 
was used in the House of Representatives until 1842, when the House 
adopted a permanent rule limiting the duration of debate.  Moreover, 
the House “often conducts business under suspension of the rules, 
which requires two-thirds support.”  GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC 
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER:  OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. 
SENATE 235 (2006).  The House “resorts to this procedure” to “expe-
dite the passage of legislation,” though it is significant that expediting 
legislation in the House requires more than a majority’s support.  Id.  
Professor Chafetz quotes approvingly from Jed Rubenfeld’s article de-
fining the term “passed” in Article I, Section 7.  Jed Rubenfeld, Rights 
of Passage:  Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 83 (1996).  The 
most important thing about Rubenfeld’s article, however, is that it was 
a failed attempt to persuade the House to abandon its rule requiring 
that at least sixty percent of the House had to agree to allow a vote on 
a tax increase.  Id. at 73. 
Third, Professor Chafetz pushes particularly hard against the ar-
gument in my Rebuttal that the filibuster is analogous to other coun-
termajoritarian practices of the Senate, such as unanimous-consent 
requirements, holds, Senate committee chairs’ decisions over the 
scheduling of committee hearings and votes, blue slips, and commit-
tee actions (or nonactions).  In a recent study, the Congressional Re-
search Service identified five such practices, see WALTER J. OLESZEK, 
SUPER-MAJORITY VOTES IN THE SENATE 2 (2008), not including a mo-
tion to amend the Senate rules governing impeachment trials.  See also 
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 445, 466 (2004).  Professor Chafetz argues that these prac-
tices are not analogous to the filibuster because none of them is nec-
essarily fatal.  Of course, the same could be said about the filibuster; it, 
too, is not necessarily obstructive.  Nevertheless, Professor Chafetz 
suggests that these procedures differ from the filibuster in that they 
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allow for ways, such as discharge petitions, by which a majority might 
maneuver around them. 
There are two problems with this argument.  The first is that dis-
charge of a bill languishing in committee is not possible in the ab-
sence of a hearing, and committee chairs have complete control over 
the scheduling—or nonscheduling—of hearings.  It is practically im-
possible to discharge a bill on which the committee has never sche-
duled or held a hearing.  Second, and more importantly, discharging 
legislation from a committee is rare.  It is rare because the Senate 
rules allow a discharge petition to be subject to the same procedures 
as other legislative business, including Rule XXII.  A discharge peti-
tion is subject, therefore, to a filibuster.  Hence, it is not fully accurate 
to say that bypassing committees is achievable only with a simple ma-
jority.  Third, apart from the filibuster, “[t]here are essentially three 
features of the [Senate] rules that form the basis of the institution’s 
tradition of obstruction:  the right of recognition, the absence of a 
previous question rule, and the lack of a germaneness rule.”  WAWRO 
& SCHICKLER, supra, at 13.  The first of these is the right of each sena-
tor to be recognized by the presiding officer when she seeks the floor; 
the second is a device by which a majority can block rather than force 
a vote on a bill; and the third is the longstanding practice allowing 
senators to speak on “any topic of her choosing.”  Id. at 15.  Obstruct-
ing final floor votes on legislation is nothing new in the Senate; a con-
stitutional entitlement to such votes would be new to the Senate. 
Professor Chafetz also questions whether precedent supports the 
constitutionality of the filibuster—though it does, in more than one 
way.  To begin with, the Senate has an unbroken tradition of amend-
ing its rules in accordance with its rules.  Moreover, on four occasions, 
the Senate has expressly refused to recognize the unconstitutionality 
of Rule XXII or the constitutional entitlement of a majority to amend 
Rule XXII without having to comply with Senate rules.  On all these 
occasions, the Senate rejected vice-presidential judgments that Rule 
XXII violated majority rule.  On three other occasions, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized that the Senate is “a continuing body,” 
a dicta that is completely consistent with both the legality and necessi-
ty of standing Senate rules.  On yet another occasion, the Supreme 
Court rejected the kind of principle for which Professor Chafetz is ar-
guing when it held that the Constitution does not “require[] that a 
majority always prevail on every issue.”  Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 
(1971).  Together, these precedents provide forceful support for the 
filibuster and its entrenchment within Rule XXII. 
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Professor Chafetz does not comment on the Senate’s design, 
which provides additional constitutional support for the Senate’s 
standing rules, including Rule XXII.  Such rules are fully consistent 
with the Senate’s design as “a continuing body,” two-thirds of which 
carries over from one legislative session to the next.  The argument 
that Rule XXII violates an anti-entrenchment principle implicitly in-
corporated into Article I depends in part on the rights of newly 
elected or reelected senators to determine their internal rules of go-
vernance.  It makes no sense, however, to give such rights to senators 
who have not gone through the special circumstances that are sup-
posed to give rise to such rights in the first place. 
The question remains how to fix the filibuster.  Professor Cha-
fetz’s answer, that the Senate must break its rules, would produce dis-
astrous consequences.  It would signify the end of the Senate’s nu-
merous other countermajoritarian features, practices, rules, traditions, 
and norms.  More importantly, it would produce a terrible precedent 
that would legitimize a majority’s breaking the rules whenever it liked.  
Just how terrible the Senate considers such a precedent to be is evi-
dent from the fact that the Senate has steadfastly refused to create it. 
The Constitution leaves the fate of the filibuster in the hands of 
senators and the American people.  The fact that the filibuster is a 
practice that many people dislike does not make it unconstitutional.  
Nor does the fact that it is constitutional mean that it must be done.  
A tax increase is a good analogy; it might be constitutional but it’s 
generally a bad idea.  We can, however, keep faith with the principle 
of majoritarianism without constitutionalizing it.  If the Senate’s deli-
berative function is broken, it is because a majority lacks the courage 
of its convictions.  This is not always true, as reflected in the Senate’s 
passage of significant education, economic, and healthcare legislation 
within the past twelve months.  Nevertheless, the place to find or forti-
fy the courage to change the filibuster is the electoral process.  The 
filibuster will not likely change until or unless the American people 
want to change it.  As history shows, they sometimes do, and when 
they do, the filibuster will have met its match.  But until then, the fili-
buster still stands. 
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